Abstract. Autonomous agents are being increasingly used in a wide range of applications. Most applications involve or require multiple agents operating in complex environments and, over time, conflicts inevitably occur among them. Negotiation is the predominant process for resolving conflicts. Recent interest in electronic commerce has also given increased importance to negotiation. This paper presents a generic negotiation model for autonomous agents that handles multi-party, multi-issue and repeated rounds. The model is based on computationally tractable assumptions.
Introduction
Autonomous agents operate in complex environments and, over time, conflicts inevitably occur among them. Conflict resolution is crucial for achieving coordination. The predominant process for resolving conflicts is negotiation. Recent interest in electronic commerce has also given increased importance to negotiation. This paper presents a generic negotiation model for autonomous agents that handles multi-party, multi-issue, and repeated rounds. The components of the model are: (i) a prenegotiation model, (ii) a multilateral negotiation protocol, (iii) an individual model of the negotiation process, (iv) a set of negotiation strategies, and (v) a set of negotiation tactics. The model is based on computationally tractable assumptions. This paper builds on our previous work [7, 8, 9, 10] . In these papers, we presented the prenegotiation model, introduced the individual model of the negotiation process, and defined a number of negotiation tactics. In this paper, we present a multilateral negotiation protocol, continue the description of the individual model and introduce a set of negotiation strategies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a generic model of individual behavior for autonomous agents. The model forms a basis for the development of negotiating agents. Section 3 presents a generic model of negotiation for autonomous agents. Finally, related work and concluding remarks are presented in sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Preparing and Planning for Negotiation
The prenegotiation model defines the main tasks that each agent ag i ∈Ag must attend to in order to prepare and plan for negotiation. A brief description of these tasks follows (see [9] for an in-depth discussion). 
Negotiation Problem
where NPT ik ⊆PL i is a list of plan templates, ≤ h and ≤ t have the meaning just specified, and ≤ a is a binary relation establishing alternatives among the plan templates in NPT ik . The nodes of the And-Or tree are plan templates. The header of the root node describes the negotiation goal g ik .
The structure NPstruct ik is generated from plan p ik by an iterative procedure involving: (i) problem structure interpretation, (ii) plan decomposition, (iii) goal selection, (iv) plan retrieval, and (v) plan addition [9] . Negotiation Strategy Selection. The agent ag i has a library SL i ={str i1 ,…} of negotiation strategies and a library TL i ={tact i1 ,…} of negotiation tactics. Negotiation strategies are functions that define the tactics to be used at the beginning and during the course of negotiation (see subsection 3.4). Negotiation tactics are functions that define the moves to be made at each point of the negotiation process (see subsection 3.5). Strategy selection is an important task and must be carefully planned [3, 12, 13] . In this paper, we assume that ag i selects a strategy str ik ∈SL i accordingly to his experience.
A Multilateral Negotiation Protocol
The protocol defines the set of possible tasks that each agent ag i can perform at each point of the negotiation process. A negotiation strategy specifies a task from the set of possible tasks. A global description of the negotiation process follows.
The process starts with ag i communicating a negotiation proposal prop ikm to all the agents in A=Ag-{ag i }. A negotiation proposal is a set of facts (see subsection 3.3). Each agent ag j ∈A receives prop ikm and may decide either: (i) to accept prop ikm , (ii) to reject prop ikm without making a critique, or (iii) to reject prop ikm and making a critique. A critique is a statement about issue priorities.
The process of negotiation proceeds with ag i receiving the responses of all the agents in A. Next, ag i checks whether a negotiation agreement was reached. If the proposal prop ikm was accepted by all the agents in A, the negotiation process ends successfully. In this case, ag i informs the agents in A that an agreement was reached. Otherwise, ag i can act either: (i) by communicating a new proposal prop ikm+1 , or (ii) by acknowledging the receipt of all the responses.
The process continues with the agents in A receiving the response of ag i . If ag i decides to communicate a new proposal prop ikm+1 , each agent ag j ∈A may again decide: (i) to accept prop ikm+1 , or (ii) to reject prop ikm+1 without making a critique, or (iii) to reject prop ikm+1 and making a critique. If ag i decides to acknowledge the receipt of the responses, the process continues to a new round in which another agent ag k ∈Ag communicates a proposal to all the agents in A k =Ag-{ag k }. This is repeated for other agents in Ag.
The Negotiation Process (Individual Perspective)
The individual model of the negotiation process specifies the tasks that each agent must perform in order to negotiate in a competent way. These tasks (or processes) are shown in Fig. 1 Fig. 1 . The negotiation process (perspective of every agent that communicates a proposal)
Negotiation Strategies
This subsection describes two classes of strategies, called concession and problem solving strategies.
Concession strategies are functions that define the opening negotiation and concession tactics. In this paper, we consider three sub-classes of strategies: 1. starting high and conceding slowly -model an optimistic opening attitude and successive small concessions; 2. starting reasonable and conceding moderately -model a realistic opening attitude and successive moderate concessions; 3. starting low and conceding rapidly -model a pessimistic opening attitude and successive large concessions. The starting high and conceding slowly strategies are formalized by analogous functions. For instance, a strategy SH01 is formalized by a function:
where state is the state of the negotiation, F∈[0,1] is the concession factor, tact ik is the tactic specified by the strategy, starting_optimistic is an opening negotiation tactic, and const_factor_tact is a constant concession factor tactic (see subsection 3.5). The strategies in the other subclasses are formalized by similar functions.
Problem solving strategies define the opening negotiation, concession and compensation tactics. In this paper, we consider two sub-classes of strategies:
1. low priority concession making -model a realistic opening attitude, large concessions on issues of low priority and small concessions on other issues; 2. low priority concession making with compensation -these strategies are similar to previous strategies; however, concessions are interleaved with compensations. Low priority concession making strategies partition the set I ik of issues into: (i) subset I ik+ , corresponding to higher priority issues, and (ii) subset I ik-, corresponding to the remaining issues. Again, the strategies in this sub-class are formalized by analogous functions. For instance, a strategy LP01 is formalized by a function:
where state and const_factor_tact have the meaning just specified, F 1 and F 2 are constants, tact ik and tact ik+1 are the tactics defined by the strategy, and starting_realistic is an opening negotiation tactic (see subsection 3.5). The formalization of the strategies in the other sub-class is essentially identical to that.
Negotiation Tactics
This section describes two classes of tactics, called opening negotiation and concession tactics.
Opening negotiation tactics specify a proposal to submit at the beginning of negotiation. 
We consider three tactics:
1. starting optimistic -specifies the proposal prop ik1 with the highest score;
2. starting realistic -specifies either: (i) proposal prop ikh with the lowest score, if Dif ikh ≤Dif ikh+1 , or (ii) proposal prop ikh+1 with the highest score, if Dif ikh >Dif ikh+1 ; 3. starting pessimistic -specifies the proposal prop ikn with the lowest score.
The three tactics are formalized by similar functions. For instance, the tactic starting optimistic is formalized by the following function:
Concession tactics are functions that compute new values for each issue. In this paper, we consider two sub-classes of tactics: (i) constant concession factor tactics, and (ii) total concession dependent tactics. In each sub-class, we consider five tactics: 1. stalemate -models a null concession on is ikj ; 2. tough -models a small concession on is ikj ; 3. moderate -models a moderate concession on is ikj ; 4. soft -models a large concession on is ikj ; 5. compromise -models a complete concession on is ikj . 
Related Work
The design of negotiating agents has been investigated from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. Researchers following the theoretical perspective attempt mainly to develop formal models. Some researchers define the modalities of the mental state of the agents, develop a logical model of individual behavior, and then use the model as a basis for the development of a formal model of negotiation or argumentation (e.g., [6] ). However, most researchers are neutral with respect to the modalities of the mental state and just develop formal models of negotiation (e.g., [5] ). Generally speaking, most theoretical models are rich but restrictive. They made assumptions that severely limit their applicability to solve real problems.
Researchers following the practical perspective attempt mainly to develop computational models, i.e., models specifying the key data structures and the processes operating on these structures. Some researchers start with a model of individual behavior, develop or adopt a negotiation model, and then integrate both models (e.g., [11] ). Again, most researchers prefer to be neutral about the model of individual behavior and just develop negotiation models (e.g., [1] ). Broadly speaking, most computational models are based on ad hoc principles. They lack a rigorous theoretical grounding. Despite these, some researchers believe that it is necessary to develop computational models in order to use agents in real-world applications [14] . Accordingly, we developed a computational negotiation model.
As noted, most researchers have paid little attention to the problem of how to integrate models of individual behavior with negotiation models. However, it is one of the costliest lessons of computer science that independently developed components resist subsequent integration in a smoothly functioning whole [2] . Accordingly, we developed a model that accounts for a tight integration of the individual capability of planning and the social capability of negotiation.
We are interested in negotiation among both self-motivated and cooperative agents. Our structure for representing negotiation problems is similar to decision trees and goal representation trees [4] , but there are important differences. Our approach does not require the quantitative measures typical of decision analysis. Also, our approach is based on plan templates and plan expansion, and not on production rules and forward or backward chaining. In addition, our formulae for modeling concession tactics are similar to the formulae used by Faratin et al. [1] . Again, there are important differences. The total concession criterion is not used by other researchers and our formulae: (i) assure that the agents do not negotiate in bad faith, and (ii) model important experimental conclusions about human negotiation.
Discussion and Future Work
This article has introduced a computational negotiation model for autonomous agents. There are several features of our work that should be highlighted. First, the model is generic and can be used in a wide range of domains. Second, the structure of a negotiation problem allows the direct integration of planning and negotiation. Also, this structure defines the set of negotiation issues. Third, the model supports problem restructuring ensuring a high degree of flexibility. Problem restructuring allows the dynamic addition of negotiation issues. Finally, the negotiation strategies are motivated by human negotiation procedures [3, 12] . Our aim for the future is: (i) to extend the model, and (ii) to finish the experimental validation of the model.
